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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the very purpose of affording copyright holders
exclusive rights is to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”1
The European Union justifies copyright protection as something that “helps
to ensure the maintenance and development of creativity in the interests of
authors, performers, producers, consumers, culture, industry and the public
at large.”2 Secondary markets, or markets for used goods, promote these
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1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Council Directive 2001/29, recital 9, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 11 (EC).
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very similar purposes by providing additional opportunities for consumers
to obtain copyrighted works, often below the market price for a new
version of the work.3 Currently, secondary markets for digital goods do not
exist in the United States, and although the European Union allows
software to be sold in the secondary market, it has not extended this
opportunity to any other digital goods. Consequently, American and
European consumers have been foreclosed from buying and selling used
digital music and electronic books.
Technological advancements have created access to digital formats of
copyrighted works, which has increased consumer demand for access to
secondary markets for digital goods. For example, music sales reached a
new peak in 2000, when Americans purchased 943 million CD albums,4
but with the advent of iTunes in 2003, profits from digital sales
outnumbered profits from CD sales by 2011.5 Over the past eight years,
consumers have shown their preference for digital music, due to its easy
accessibility on various devices, over physical CDs or records.6 The
electronic book market has had similar popularity and currently comprises
roughly 20% of the book sales market.7 The need for secondary markets
has become apparent, however. For instance, in 2013, sales for electronic
books only grew 5%, in part due to consumers’ inability to give away or
resell electronic books.8
There are two major reasons that secondary markets for digital goods
do not exist: (1) the failure of courts in the United States and the European
Union to extend the first sale doctrine9 (called “exhaustion” in the EU) to
3. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010).
4. Adrian Covert, A Decade of iTunes Singles Killed the Music Industry, CNN MONEY (Apr. 25,
2013, 6:09 PM ET), http://money.cnn.com/2013/04/25/technology/itunes-music-decline/.
5. Laurie Segall, Digital Music Sales Top Physical Sales, CNN MONEY (Jan. 5, 2012, 5:47 PM
ET), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/05/technology/digital_music_sales/ (“According to a Nielsen and
Billboard report, digital music purchases accounted for 50.3% of music sales in 2011. Digital sales
were up 8.4% from the previous year, while physical album sales declined 5%.”).
6. See id.
7. Andi Sporkin, Bookstats 2013 Now Available, ASS’N OF AM. PUBLISHERS (May 15, 2013),
http://publishers.org/press/103/ (citing statistics from BookStats, a co-production of the American
Association of Publishers and the Book Industry Study Group, which “captures net revenue and units
for all key publishing categories, sectors, formats and main genres”).
8. Eliana Dockterman, The Pen is Mightier: E-book Growth Stagnating, TIME (Oct. 31, 2013),
http://business.time.com/2013/10/31/the-pen-is-mightier-e-book-growth-stagnating/ (citing a report
from the Book Industry Study Group); Readers Want More Value for Ebooks, New Study Suggests,
DIGITAL BOOK WORLD (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.digitalbookworld.com/2013/readers-want-morevalue-for-ebooks-new-study-suggests/.
9. Copyright Act of 1976 § 109(a), 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (explaining that the first sale
doctrine states that a copyright owner’s exclusive distribution rights are exhausted after the owner’s
first sale of a particular copy of the copyrighted work).
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digital goods and (2) the restraints that licensing agreements place on the
ability to transfer or resell digital goods. Because there is no explicit first
sale doctrine in the digital domain, courts have largely been left to navigate
on their own its applicability to the ever-expanding digital world.
Recently, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York decided that music downloaded from iTunes could not be resold in a
secondary market because the copyright owner’s reproduction right had
been violated.10
Additionally, most, if not all, digital goods are acquired pursuant to a
licensing agreement.11 Licensing agreements prohibit licensees from
redistributing, transmitting, assigning, selling, broadcasting, renting,
sharing, lending, modifying, adapting, editing, licensing, or otherwise
transferring the digital good,12 which effectively forecloses the use of the
first sale doctrine as a defense in suits for copyright infringement. The use
of restrictive licensing agreements in connection with obtaining digital
goods should be viewed skeptically because the first sale doctrine’s
application to digital goods has significant implications for the creation and
existence of high-demand secondary markets.13
The European Union has taken steps towards making digital goods
available in secondary markets. The European Court of Justice (ECJ)
determined that exhaustion applies to software, which opened the door for
consumers to obtain software in the secondary market.14 The decision’s
application to other digital goods, however, is uncertain. Recently, a
German court determined that exhaustion does not apply to electronic

10. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
11. Digital goods are accessible on the Internet through downloading services such as iTunes and
streaming services such as Spotify and YouTube. All of these services allow users to access music by
agreeing to a licensing agreement. See, e.g., Licensed Application End User License Agreement,
APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/itunes/appstore/dev/stdeula/ (last visited Feb. 28,
2014); Spotify Terms and Conditions of Use, SPOTIFY (Mar. 5, 2014), https://www.spotify.com/us/legal/
end-user-agreement/.
12. See, e.g., Licensed Application End User License Agreement, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/
legal/internet-services/itunes/appstore/dev/stdeula/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2014); Spotify Terms and
Conditions of Use, SPOTIFY (Mar. 5, 2014), https://www.spotify.com/us/legal/end-user-agreement/.
13. As applied to digital music, the first sale doctrine may be a moot issue.
See Ben Sisario, As Music Streaming Grows, Royalties Slow to a Trickle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/business/media/streaming-shakes-up-music-industrys-model-forroyalties.html?_r=0 (“[T]he music industry is undergoing another, even more radical, digital
transformation as listeners begin to move from CDs and downloads to streaming services like Spotify,
Pandora and YouTube.”). If consumers are content with having free access to music rather than paying
to download music, the demand for a secondary market in digital music may have ceased to exist.
14. Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp. (July 3, 2012), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/.
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books.15 The incongruence between the application of exhaustion to
software but not to other copyrighted works has set the stage for the ECJ to
determine whether to expand the rule of exhaustion to all digital goods in
the European Union.
If secondary markets for digital goods are to exist, it is imperative that
either the judicial or legislative system in the United States and abroad
determine the applicability of the first sale doctrine to digital goods and
place limits on the scope of restrictive licensing schemes. Part I discusses a
recent decision from the Southern District of New York about digital
secondary markets. Part II discusses the first sale doctrine and its current
application to digital goods. Part III discusses the structure and reasoning
of the pervasive use of licensing schemes in the digital era. Part IV
discusses the intersection of the first sale doctrine and licensing schemes
and the implications for digital secondary markets. Part V discusses the
European Union’s approach to licenses and exhaustion as applied to digital
goods. Lastly, Part VI offers potential judicial and legislative solutions so
that secondary markets for digital goods can become a reality.
I. CAPITOL RECORDS, LLC V. REDIGI, INC.
In Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., the Southern District of New
York addressed the issue of whether ReDigi could permissibly enable its
users to buy and sell “used” digital copies of songs.16 ReDigi was a
marketplace for digital goods where users could buy and sell “used” music
files at a lower price than offered on digital music marketplaces such as
iTunes and Amazon.17 It only allowed “legally owned, lawfully purchased
digital works” to be purchased and sold in its marketplace and “reject[ed]
pirated or unauthorized versions.”18
Initially, to access ReDigi’s service, a user was required to download
the “Media Manager,” which identified a digital work’s source and
confirmed its eligibility for resale.19 To be eligible for sale, a file had to
have been purchased from iTunes or another ReDigi user; files downloaded
from CDs or other websites were not eligible for sale.20 Once verified, the

15. Emma Linklater, E-books Distinguished from Software, Not Exhausted, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
& PRAC. 685, 686 (2013) (discussing Case 4 O 191/11, Landgericht Bielefeld [LG][Bielefeld Regional
Court] Mar. 5, 2013).
16. 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
17. Id. at 645.
18. Theodore Serra, Rebalancing at Resale: ReDigi, Royalties, and the Digital Secondary
Market, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1753, 1757 (2013).
19. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 645.
20. Id.

COBB MACRO(DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE

6/22/2014 8:58 PM

533

file was then transferred to ReDigi’s cloud-based system, and any
duplicates were removed from the seller’s computer and synced devices.21
The seller would have access to any song designated for sale until it was
purchased, at which time access to the song would cease.22 The court
determined that ReDigi had infringed Capitol Records’s copyright because
the transfer from the seller’s computer to the cloud service had created a
copy of the file, which had violated the copyright owner’s reproduction
right.23 Because the copy on the cloud service had not been “lawfully
made,” ReDigi’s first sale defense failed.24
Given the variation in courts’ application of copyright law to digital
goods, another court might easily have determined that the transfer of the
digital file to the cloud service was lawful under the fair use doctrine
because it fulfilled copyright’s basic purpose.25 Additionally, future
technology may not require transferring a copy of the file to a cloud service
and would therefore not violate the reproduction rights of the copyright
owner. Assuming the reproduction right has not been violated, another
major hurdle arises for ReDigi: can a download from iTunes or Amazon be
lawfully resold since it was obtained pursuant to a licensing agreement?
Effectively answering this question requires looking to the history of the
first sale doctrine and the use of licenses in an age where digital goods
abound.
II. HISTORY OF THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
The Copyright Act confers upon copyright owners the exclusive rights

21. Id.
22. Id. at 646.
23. Id. at 650–51.
24. Id. at 655–56.
25. See id. at 652–53 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g
Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1998)) (“‘The ultimate test of fair use . . . is whether the copyright
law’s goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts” would be better served by allowing
the use than by preventing it.’ Accordingly, fair use permits reproduction of copyrighted work without
the copyright owner’s consent ‘for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.’” (citations omitted)). Judge
Chin, in the Southern District of New York, just granted Google, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment
based on a fair use defense in that company’s eight-year litigation against the Authors Guild over the
service “Google Books.” See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 284 (S.D.N.Y.
2013). Google made a perfect reproduction of every book contained in a number of libraries across the
country in order to digitally display snippets of the books in its online database, Google Books. Id. at
286. The court determined that this practice was acceptable under the fair use defense, which “permits
the fair use of copyrighted works ‘to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.”‘“ Id. at 289–90 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
575 (1994)).
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to reproduce and distribute their work.26 In 1908, the Supreme Court of the
United States, in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, limited the copyright
owner’s exclusive right to distribute by recognizing the first sale doctrine.27
At issue in Bobbs-Merrill was whether a copyright owner could restrict the
resale terms of its copyrighted material.28 The Court interpreted the
copyright statute’s “sole right to vend” language to prohibit a publisher
from restricting future sales of a book by placing a notice on the cover that
limits resale to a price of one dollar or more.29 Specifically, the court found
that copyright holders may not “fasten, by notice . . . a restriction upon the
subsequent alienation of the subject-matter of copyright after the owner had
parted with the title to one who had acquired full dominion over it and had
given a satisfactory price for it.”30 One year later, Congress codified the
first sale doctrine in section 41 of the 1909 Copyright Act.31
The first sale doctrine is an affirmative defense that exhausts a
copyright owner’s exclusive distribution right after the owner’s first sale of
a particular copy of the copyrighted work.32 The doctrine is invoked if the
defendant has full ownership of the copy of the work in question and that
copy was obtained legally.33 Therefore, “[i]llegal copies of copyrighted
works do not receive the benefit of the first sale doctrine,” even if the
illegal copy was obtained through seemingly lawful means.34
In 1996, the Registrar of the Copyright Office stated that “[t]he first
sale doctrine was developed to avoid restraints on the alienation of physical
property, and to prevent publishers from controlling not only initial sales of
books, but the after-market for resales.”35 Ultimately, the main question
under the first sale doctrine can be characterized as “whether or not there

26. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (explaining that “the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in
copies or phonorecords; . . . (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”).
27. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
28. Id. at 343.
29. Id. at 349–51.
30. Id. at 349–50.
31. Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1976)),
repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in 17
U.S.C.) (resolving that “nothing in this title shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of
any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained”).
32. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010).
33. Rachel Ann Geist, A “License to Read”: The Effect of E-books on Publishers, Libraries, and
the First Sale Doctrine, 52 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. REV. 63, 69–70 (2012).
34. Id.
35. Marybeth Peters, The Spring 1996 Horace S. Manges Lecture – The National Information
Infrastructure: A Copyright Office Perspective, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 341, 356 (1996).
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has been such a disposition of the copyrighted article that it may fairly be
said that the copyright proprietor has received his reward for its use.”36
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has determined that there is no
geographical boundary to the first sale doctrine: it applies to copies of
copyrighted works manufactured abroad.37 Therefore, copyright owners
cannot prevent a copyrighted work, lawfully manufactured and sold abroad,
from being imported and resold in the United States.38
In 2001, however, the United States Copyright Office rejected the
extension of the first sale doctrine to digital works.39 It stated that
“[b]ecause the underlying purpose of the first sale doctrine is to ensure the
free circulation of tangible copies, it simply cannot be said that a
transformation of section 109 to cover digital transmissions furthers that
purpose.”40
Furthermore, it noted that the first sale doctrine is “limited in the offline world by a number of factors, including geography and the gradual
degradation of books and analog works” and that “[t]he absence of such
limitations would have an adverse effect on the market for digital works.”41
Specifically, the Office noted that such limitations do not distinguish digital
secondary markets in the way that they distinguish physical markets:
Physical copies of works degrade with time and use, making used copies
less desirable than new ones. Digital information does not degrade, and
can be reproduced perfectly on a recipient’s computer. The “used” copy
is just as desirable as (in fact, is indistinguishable from) a new copy of
the same work. Time, space, effort and cost no longer act as barriers to
the movement of copies, since digital copies can be transmitted nearly
instantaneously anywhere in the world with minimal effort and
negligible cost. The need to transport physical copies of works, which
acts as a natural brake on the effect of resales on the copyright owner’s
market, no longer exists in the realm of digital transmissions. The ability

36. Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
37. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355–56 (2013).
38. Id.
39. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 87–88 (2001).
40. Id. There are several differences between consumer sales law and copyright law. Consumer
sales law originates from an idea of ownership that allows the buyer of any good to use that good as the
buyer sees fit. N. Helberger et al., Digital Content Contracts for Consumers, 36 J. CONSUMER POL’Y
37, 46 (2013). Conversely, “the basic tenet of copyright law is that ownership of a physical copy of a
work does not grant any ownership in the copyright on the work embodied in the physical object”;
rather, the purchaser owns the physical copy of the work but is simply a licensee of the copyright
contained in the physical good. Id. Since digital goods are not embodied in a physical copy, a
straightforward application of consumer sales law to digital goods becomes difficult in light of
copyright law. Id.
41. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 39, at xi.
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of such “used” copies to compete for market share with new copies is
thus far greater in the digital world.42

The Copyright Office was also concerned with the use of effective
“forward-and-delete” technology.43 A person who sells a tangible item no
longer has access to that item. In the digital age, however, unless the
seller’s copy is deleted upon resale, the seller can retain a copy of the work.
The Copyright Office did not trust that consumers would delete their copies
upon resale and, furthermore, that effective technology that would
automatically delete the seller’s copy existed.44
In justifying its position on the first sale doctrine, the Copyright Office
stated that “[t]he tangible nature of the copy is not a mere relic of a bygone
technology.”45 Eighteen years later, however, physical copies of music and
books may be a mere relic since accessing works via digital technology is
standard practice. Additionally, the Copyright Office found persuasive that
the international community had not yet extended the first sale doctrine to
digital goods.46 Ultimately, due to “potential harm to the market and
increased risk of infringement,” the Copyright Office determined that the
first sale doctrine, as applied to digital goods, “could substantially reduce
the incentive to create.”47 Regardless of the Copyright Office’s stance on
the application of the first sale doctrine to digital goods, most, if not all,
digital goods are obtained pursuant to a licensing agreement, which, as
detailed below, may currently prevent such application.
III. LICENSING IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Many providers offer digitally transmitted works to consumers
pursuant to license agreements.48 A buyer who purchases a digital song
from iTunes, for example, agrees to a license that prohibits not only resale
but also any subsequent transfer of the digital file.49
There are a number of reasons that companies offer digital goods to
consumers pursuant to a license agreement. First, a license agreement
“allows for tiered pricing . . . such as reduced pricing for students or

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 82–83 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 94–95.
Id. at 88.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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educational institutions.”50
Specifically, licensing allows software
companies to charge according to the features required by the consumer:
software containing “highly technical features that businesses would need”
costs more than software encompassing “basic features that students would
need.”51 Furthermore, some companies charge more based on the length of
access required, allowing users to choose between long-term and shortterm licenses.52 For tiered pricing to be economically feasible, the products
must be licensed rather than sold, which “avoids the first sale doctrine and
so precludes an aftermarket for software that ultimately would result in
higher retail prices for consumers.”53 This argument, however, is less
applicable to digital goods, as consumers license songs and books without
any additional technical features or restrictions on the length of access.
Second, licenses reduce the number of incidents of piracy by limiting
the ability of digital goods to be resold or transferred.54 The district court
in Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. found this argument “unconvincing,” however,
because “[p]iracy depends on the number of people willing to engage in
piracy, and a pirate is presumably just as happy to unlawfully duplicate
software purchased directly from [the corporation] as he is to copy software
purchased from a reseller.”55 In other words, a person who is motivated to
pirate digital goods will do so regardless of whether those goods are sold in
a secondary market.
Third, and most relevant to this discussion, licenses enable
“distributors to give customers many more options for accessing and using
digital content.”56 Specifically, consumers can download songs, films, and
eBooks to multiple devices, which enables them to “access that song, film,
or eBook from virtually anywhere at anytime, which would not be the case
if the customer had purchased a CD, DVD, or paperback book.”57 Access
options are particularly relevant to the business models of services like
Netflix, Spotify, and Pandora. Netflix offers consumers access to an entire

50. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010).
51. Gary Donatello, Killing the Secondary Market: How the Ninth Circuit Interpreted Vernor and
Aftermath to Destroy the First Sale Doctrine, 22 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 59, 85 (2012).
52. Id.
53. Justin Graham, Preserving the Aftermarket in Copyrighted Works: Adapting the First Sale
Doctrine to the Emerging Technological Landscape, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶ 22 (2002).
54. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1115.
55. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., No. C07-1189RAJ, 2009 WL 3187613, at *14 (W.D. Wash. Sept.
30, 2009), vacated, 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
56. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Copyright Alliance in Support of Affirmance at 18, Adobe Sys.
Inc., v. Kornrumpf, No. 12-16616 (9th Cir. July 5, 2013) [hereinafter Brief of the Copyright Alliance].
57. Id. at 20–21.
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library of movies and television shows for a monthly fee.58 Spotify offers a
number of different licenses to access digital music from which consumers
can choose, including a free option that allows consumers to stream an
unlimited amount of music that is occasionally interrupted by
advertisements and paid options that do not include advertisements.59
Licensing also allows consumers to “secure a license for the particular
song, television episode, or chapter they want, rather than having to buy the
whole record album, the entire season of the television show, or the entire
book.”60
Opponents of licensing schemes believe, however, that
the model for online publishing is shifting from a property-based system
of transactions governed by copyright law to a contract-based system of
transactions governed by whatever terms the market will bear, even if
such terms do not further the pro-dissemination values inherent in the
Copyright Clause and in copyright law.61

In particular, licenses “do[] not vindicate the law’s aversion to restraints on
alienation of personal property,” and they “ignore[] the economic realities
of the relevant transactions, in which the copyright owner permanently
released software copies into the stream of commerce without expectation
of return in exchange for upfront payment of the full software price.”62
Most importantly, expansive licensing schemes have the potential to
destroy secondary markets.63 Secondary markets “contribute[] to the public
good by (1) giving consumers additional opportunities to purchase and sell
copyrighted works, often at below-retail prices; (2) allowing consumers to
obtain copies of works after a copyright owner has ceased distribution; and
(3) allowing the proliferation of businesses.”64 Therefore, it is important
that restrictive licensing schemes be limited so that secondary markets are
available for digital goods.
58. Netflix Terms of Use, NETFLIX, https://signup.netflix.com/TermsOfUse (last updated Sept. 11,
2013).
59. Brief of the Copyright Alliance, supra note 56.
60. Id. at 21.
61. Kathleen K. Olson, Preserving the Copyright Balance: Statutory and Constitutional
Preemption of Contract-Based Claims, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 83, 88 (2006).
62. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010).
63. See Donatello, supra note 51, at 81 (“One of the main arguments in favor of a restrictive
interpretation of license agreements is the fear of the destruction of the secondary market. Copyright
holders in all industries may wish to destroy the secondary markets for their works. This would force
all consumers to purchase directly from the copyright holder, allowing them to reap all of the profits.”
(footnote omitted)).
64. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1115.
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IV. INTERSECTION OF THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE AND
LICENSES IN THE UNITED STATES
This leads to two important and related questions regarding the
application of the first sale doctrine to digital goods: (1) is the application
of the first sale doctrine to digital goods moot; and (2) if not, does it apply
to digital goods obtained pursuant to a license?
With respect to the first question, the first sale doctrine as applied to
digital music may be moot. Apple is on track to have its first yearly
decline in digital music downloads since it launched iTunes in 2003.65
According to the tracking service Nielsen SoundScan,66 as of October
2013, music downloads were down 4% from the same time the previous
year.67 Many music analysts and executives attribute this decline to
streaming services such as Spotify and Pandora.68 Further proof of the
increasing preference for streaming services was the September 2013
unveiling of iTunes Radio, Apple’s response to streaming services like
Spotify and Pandora.69
While the ability of services such as Spotify to eventually lead
consumers to purchase music remains to be seen, at this juncture,
consumers seem content with the ability to immediately access songs rather
than having permanent access to digital files stored on their computer.70
Why would consumers pay to download songs (and receive only a limited
license, not ownership) when they can access those same songs for a
nominal fee through streaming services? Given that consumers do not own
(and perhaps do not care to own) the music that they are accessing through
streaming services, there is no demand for a secondary market in digital
music. Without demand, the question of the first sale doctrine’s
applicability to digital music does not even arise. Furthermore, the policy
reasons behind secondary markets do not apply when consumers have the

65. Ben Sisario, As Downloads Dip, Music Executives Cast a Wary Eye on Streaming Services,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/21/business/media/as-downloads-dipmusic-executives-cast-a-wary-eye-on-streaming-services.html.
66. Audience Measurement, NIELSEN, http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/nielsen-solutions/audiencemeasurement.html (last visited June 2, 2014) (“Our audience measurement data and advanced solutions
provide a comprehensive picture of how, when and where your consumers are connecting with content.
With this insight, you can create programming that viewers love, which will make you a hit with
advertisers.”).
67. Sisario, supra note 65.
68. Id.
69. iTunes Radio, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/itunes/itunes-radio/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
70. Alan McGlade, Steve Jobs was Wrong – Consumers Want to Rent Their Music, Not Own It
(Mar. 25, 2013, 1:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alanmcglade/2013/03/25/steve-jobs-was-wrongconsumers-want-to-rent-their-music-not-own-it/.
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ability to freely access any music they want via Spotify, Pandora, and
Youtube.71 Even assuming that a consumer wants to download music
rather than simply have access to streaming music, it is uncertain whether
the twenty cents saved by purchasing a “used” song on ReDigi rather than a
“new” song on iTunes is enough to create demand in the secondary market
for digital music.
Although the demand for secondary markets for digital music may
have evaporated since the creation of streaming music, it is still reasonable
to believe that secondary markets for other digital goods will continue to be
in high demand. Given the decline in sales growth of electronic books,
some commentators believe that
[w]e may be discovering that e-books are well suited to some types of
books (like genre fiction) but not well suited to other types (like
nonfiction and literary fiction) and are well suited to certain reading
situations (plane trips) but less well suited to others (lying on the couch
at home). The e-book may turn out to be more a complement to the
printed book, as audiobooks have long been, rather than an outright
substitute.72

Furthermore, while other countries have launched “streaming”
electronic book services, such services are currently limited in the United
States, and the prominent option for obtaining electronic books is through
“ownership”: downloading the book, pursuant to a license, from a
provider.73 Given the recent trend in streaming music, it may be only a
matter of time before streaming electronic book services are available in

71. Specifically, a secondary market is not needed if consumers are not purchasing or licensing
the music in the first place but are instead listening to it for free on services like YouTube.
72. Nicholas Carr, Will Gutenberg Laugh Last, ROUGH TYPE (Jan. 1, 2013, 4:50 PM), http://
www.roughtype.com/?p=2296.
73. See Emma Hutchings, 24Symbols Aims to Become the “Spotify for E-books,” PSFK (Apr. 11,
2011),
http://www.psfk.com/2011/04/24symbols-aims-to-become-the-spotify-for-e-books.html
(“24symbols is a Spanish startup currently in beta ahead of its launch in June [2011]. Adopting a
‘freemium’ model, the service will offer readers different alternatives, such as streaming books for free
with ads, and paying a subscription for advanced options like offline reading and an extended catalogue
to choose from.”); Jeremy Greenfield, Why Netflix or Spotify for Ebooks Will Work, FORBES (Oct. 29,
2013, 4:49 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremygreenfield/2013/10/29/why-netflix-or-spotify-forebooks-will-work/ (quoting James McQuivey, an analyst of the book publishing industry)_(“All the
evidence suggests that consumers love subscription content models – it’s the original model of
magazines and newspapers and cable, and now it’s the power behind Netflix. I believe it would work
with books, but like the ebook model in the early days, it won’t work until the publishers are ready to
embrace it.”). These are subscription-based models, however, and services like YouTube or
advertisement-based free access may never exist in the electronic book arena. Therefore, the secondary
market for e-books is still in demand by users.
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the United States. Providers of electronic books recognize the immediate
viability of the secondary market, as Amazon has recently patented
technology to create one.74 The impact that streaming services will have on
the electronic book market remains to be seen; the applicability of a digital
first sale doctrine to electronic books, however, is immediately relevant.
With respect to the second question, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., determined that
the first sale doctrine only applies to legal owners of a copyrighted good
and does not extend to licensees of a copy.75 Autodesk, a software
manufacturer, sold a software program to consumers pursuant to a software
license agreement, to which consumers had to agree prior to installing the
software.76 Specifically, the license “recite[d] that Autodesk retains title to
all copies . . . that the customer has a nonexclusive and nontransferable
license to use . . . [and] impose[d] transfer restrictions, prohibiting
customers from renting, leasing, or transferring the software without
Autodesk’s prior consent.”77 Vernor purchased copies of Autodesk’s
software and subsequently posted them for sale on eBay.78 Pursuant to the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Autodesk issued a takedown notice to
eBay, claiming that Vernor’s sales infringed its copyright, and eBay
terminated Vernor’s auction.79 Vernor brought a declaratory action against
Autodesk, stating that his sales of the software were protected by the first
sale doctrine.80 The court looked to three factors to determine if a software
user is a licensee rather than an owner: (1) “whether the copyright owner
specifie[d] that a user [wa]s granted a license,” (2) “whether the copyright
owner significantly restrict[ed] the user’s ability to transfer the software,”
and (3) “whether the copyright owner impose[d] notable use restrictions.”81
In determining that Vernor was a licensee, the court stated that he was not
entitled to invoke the first sale doctrine because he had not received title to
the copies and “accordingly could not pass ownership on to others.”82
To clarify the Vernor decision, the Ninth Circuit, in MDY Industries,
LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., determined the circumstances in
74. Amazon Poised to Sell Used E-books, PUBLISHERS WKLY. (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/bookselling/article/55849-amazonpoised-to-sell-used-e-books.html.
75. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010).
76. Id. at 1104.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1105.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1106.
81. Id. at 1110–11.
82. Id. at 1112.
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which a violation of a license agreement amounts to copyright infringement
and when it is simply a breach of contract.83 The difference between
breach of contract and copyright infringement is substantial: a copyright
infringer may be subject to statutory damages of up to $150,000 for each
infringement.84 The court noted that if the terms of the license amount to a
condition, then a breach of that condition constitutes copyright
infringement.85 If the terms of the license amount to a covenant, then a
breach of that covenant is actionable only under contract law.86 The two
are distinguishable because “[a] covenant is a contractual promise,” while a
“condition precedent is an act or event that must occur before a duty to
perform a promise arises.”87 Therefore, a copyright owner who grants a
nonexclusive, limited license generally may not sue their licensees for
copyright infringement but may instead only recover under a breach of
contract theory.88 But, if the licensee acts outside the scope of the license
agreement, then the copyright owner may sue the licensee for copyright
infringement.89 This is significant because individuals who sell or transfer
digital goods that they obtained pursuant to a licensing agreement are
generally acting outside of the scope of the agreement and will be liable for
copyright infringement, not simply breach of contract.90
The Ninth Circuit, in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, placed some
restrictions on the ability of copyright owners to control transfers of their
goods through the use of licenses.91 Perhaps realizing the significant
implications of the rights granted to an “owner” as opposed to a “licensee,”
the court ruled that compact discs distributed to music critics and DJs for
promotional purposes only are owned by the recipient and may be resold or
otherwise transferred without the copyright owner’s consent pursuant to the
first sale doctrine of the Copyright Act and the Unordered Merchandise
Statute.92 The court noted that simply calling a transaction “a license rather
than a sale, although it [is] a factor to be considered, [is] not by itself

83. 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012).
85. 629 F.3d at 939 (citing Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. (Sun I), 188 F.3d 1115,
1120 (9th Cir. 1999)).
86. Id. (citing Sun I, 188 F.3d at 1120).
87. Id. (citing TravelCenters of Am. LLC v. Brog, No. 3751-CC, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 183, at *9
(Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 2008); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981)).
88. Id. (quoting Sun I, 188 F.3d at 1121).
89. Id. (citing Sun I, 188 F.3d at 1121).
90. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010) (determining that because
Vernor was a licensee and not an owner, his actions infringed upon Autodesk’s copyright).
91. 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011).
92. Id. at 1178–79.
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dispositive of the issue.”93 The court determined that these distributions
were “sales,” not “licenses,” because they had been unsolicited, because
there was no evidence that the recipients had agreed to a license, and
because the distributor had made no effort to track the use or disposition of
the CDs after they had been distributed.94
Additionally, the Copyright Office has stated that the first sale
doctrine does not extend to cover digital transmission.95 With the world
quickly shifting towards digital access to copyrighted works, however, the
underlying policies of the first sale doctrine still apply. It seems fairly
obvious that a major reason companies such as Apple and Amazon are
offering digital goods pursuant to licenses is to control the after-market for
resales. In this respect, whether the good is tangible or intangible, these
practices are hard to distinguish from the facts at issue in Bobbs-Merrill, as
they all attempt to prevent individuals from profiting from downstream
sales.
V. THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE AND DIGITAL GOODS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
The ECJ was recently faced with the question of whether the first sale
doctrine applies to software in UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International
Corp., and, in stark contrast to United States courts, determined that
content licenses may not prohibit the further transfer or resale of software
under Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24.96 UsedSoft enables companies to
resell software licenses that they have purchased but do not use or need.97
Oracle develops computer software and distributes it to consumers by
allowing users to download it from the Internet.98 When UsedSoft sold
customers used licenses, the purchasers were able to download a copy of
Oracle’s software to their computers.99 Subsequently, Oracle brought suit
against UsedSoft.100
The ECJ was faced with the task of interpreting the Computer
Programs Directive to determine if UsedSoft had violated Oracle’s
reproduction right. Unlike the district court in ReDigi, however, the ECJ
was able to avoid the reproduction issue by equating the sale of the used
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 1180 (citing Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1109).
Id. at 1180.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 39.
Case C-128/11 (July 3, 2012), available at http://curia.europa.eu/.
Id. ¶¶ 24–25.
Id. ¶ 21.
Id. ¶ 26.
Id. ¶ 27.
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license to that of the original downloaded copy.101 Pursuant to article 5(1)
of the Computer Programs Directive, a “lawful acquirer” of a computer
program does not need authorization from the copyright holder to use the
program in accordance with its intended purpose.102 Additionally, Article
4(2) states, “The first sale in the Community of a copy of a program by the
rightholder or with his consent shall exhaust the distribution right within
the Community of that copy, with the exception of the right to control
further rental of the program or a copy thereof.”103 The ECJ noted that “a
commonly accepted definition [of] a ‘sale’ is an agreement by which a
person, in return for payment, transfers to another person his rights of
ownership in an item of tangible or intangible property belonging to
him.”104 The court then determined that a buyer of used software is a
“lawful acquirer” under article 5(1) because the buyer retains the original
license to the software.105
Therefore, the court interpreted the first sale doctrine broadly,
applying it to “the grant of a right to use a copy of a computer program, for
an unlimited period, in return for payment of a fee designed to enable the
copyright holder to obtain a remuneration corresponding to the economic
value of the copy of the work” regardless of whether it was purchased
pursuant to a license agreement.106 If the first sale doctrine were not
interpreted broadly, “the effectiveness of [Article 4(2)] would be
undermined, since suppliers would merely have to call the contract a
‘licence’ rather than a ‘sale’ in order to circumvent the rule of exhaustion
and divest it of all scope.”107 The UsedSoft decision made clear that
exhaustion applies to used software in the European Union.108 It is less
clear whether exhaustion applies to other digital goods, such as electronic
books or music.
Recently, the German Regional Court of Bielefeld determined that the
UsedSoft decision does not apply to electronic or audio books.109 The court
reasoned that the UsedSoft decision had relied upon the Computer
Programs Directive and therefore applies solely to software—not to any

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. ¶¶ 61–63.
Council Directive 2009/24, art. 5, ¶ 1, 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16, 18 (EC).
Id. art. 4, ¶ 2.
Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH, ¶ 42.
Id. ¶ 89.
Id. ¶ 49.
Id.
Id. ¶ 88.
Linklater, supra note 15.
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other digital goods.110 The court looked to the Information Society
Directive, which provides for the exhaustion of copyright, and found that it
did not contain language comparable to Article 5(1) of the Computer
Programs Directive, which allows for the resale of used software.111
Without similar language, the court concluded that the resale of used
electronic books is prohibited.112 The parties have indicated their intent to
appeal, but as it stands now, this decision upholds the status quo regarding
the resale of electronic books in Europe.113
Currently, the United States and the European Union have different
stances on the first sale doctrine as applied to software.114 Article 4(2) of
the Computer Programs Directive explicitly states that a sale of software
within the EU only exhausts all rights within the EU;115 therefore, United
States law will govern software that was produced in the EU but licensed to
a consumer in the United States. But under the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., software that United
States corporations license to consumers in the EU can be resold or
transferred to a third party in the EU, who, in turn, can then resell it in the
United States.116 Although Vernor explicitly prohibits applying the first
sale doctrine to licensees,117 courts will be faced with determining whether
the United States consumer who purchased the license from the EU is a
licensee or an owner.
VI. CREATING A DIGITAL FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
Given the current state of the law and the pervasive licensing of digital
goods, secondary markets for those goods will be unavailable for the
foreseeable future. Although the demand for secondary markets for digital
music may be waning, there may be serious implications for consumers’
ability to participate in a secondary market for electronic books. For
consumers to have access to secondary markets in both the United States
and the EU, the judicial or legislative systems in those two governments
must alter the state of the current law.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Compare Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), with
Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., (July 3, 2012), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/.
115. Council Directive 2009/24, supra note 102.
116. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) (holding that the first sale
doctrine applies to copies of copyrighted works lawfully made in foreign countries).
117. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010).
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A. Judicial Response in the United States
To access digital secondary markets in the United States, users must
get around the copyright owner’s reproduction right and, perhaps more
importantly, the restrictive licensing schemes attached to all digital goods.
Federal courts have exceptional latitude within the arena of copyright law.
Absent congressional intervention, judicial decisions have advanced and
defined copyright law, for better or worse. Therefore, the judicial system
has the ability to expand consumer protection by limiting restrictive
licensing agreements and by expanding the first sale doctrine to digital
goods. Consumers may attempt to challenge licenses through the copyright
misuse defense or by claiming that they are adhesion contracts.
Additionally, courts in the United States and in the EU may determine, as
the ECJ did in the case of software, that the restrictive licensing schemes
attached to digital goods are simply a device used by corporations to escape
the first sale doctrine in contravention of the basic purpose of copyright.
Copyright misuse “is a judicially crafted affirmative defense to
copyright infringement, derived from the long-standing existence of such a
defense in patent litigation.”118 The Supreme Court has not yet weighed in
on the viability of the defense, which has caused confusion in the circuits:
“several circuits allow a misuse defense to stand where a defendant can
demonstrate a violation of ‘public policy,’ whereas other courts require
copyright misuse defendants to make a showing that the plaintiff violated
the antitrust laws by attempting to extend its copyright.”119 Courts that
adhere to the public policy-based defense look “specifically at copyright
licensing provisions and decide[] whether the scope of the private rights
granted by the copyright is being improperly expanded.”120 Under this
reading, circuit courts have affirmed findings of copyright misuse where
“the licensor restricted the licensee’s ability to develop similar software,
effectively expanding the scope of the copyright beyond the protected
expression to the unprotected idea”; where “license provisions restrict[ed]
the licensee’s ability to use competing products”; and where a “license
provision[] . . . restricted a licensee’s ability to develop products to
compete with the licensor’s uncopyrighted products.”121 Courts that adhere
to the antitrust-based defense focus “on assessing the challenged conduct’s
118. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2011).
119. Scott A. Sher, In Re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation: Defining the Contours of the
Copyright Misuse Doctrine, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 325, 328 (2002).
120. Brett Frischmann & Daniel Moyland, The Evolving Doctrine of Copyright Misuse, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE
269, 292 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).
121. Id.
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actual and potential effect on competition.”122 Courts will first “evaluate
the scope of the rights and the breadth of protection granted to copyright
holders; and, second, . . . evaluate the net competitive effects of any
questionable conduct.”123
Under either approach, it seems at least plausible that the Court could
find that the licensing schemes used in connection with digital goods
amount to copyright misuse. Unfortunately, the copyright misuse defense
has not been successfully used to challenge the validity of licensing
schemes that prevent resale in secondary markets in the United States.124 In
the EU, while the ECJ did not specifically state in UsedSoft that the
software license amounted to copyright misuse, it found that allowing
licenses that restricted resale would completely undermine the rule of
exhaustion.125
Consumers may also challenge these licenses as unconscionable
adhesion contracts. State law governs the contours of adhesion contracts;
for example, California has defined such a contract as “a standardized
contract, drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, that relegates
to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or
reject it.”126 Even though a contract is adhesive, it “must still be interpreted
in the light of the reasonable expectations of the adhering parties”127 and
will not be struck down by the court “[a]bsent clear evidence of other
factors, such as undue oppression or unconscionability.”128
One example of unconscionable adhesion contracts are “shrinkwrap”
licenses, which “refer[] to the fact that the license begins when the
purchaser reads its terms and tears open the transparent plastic wrapping, or
‘shrinkwrap,’ that encloses the software product.”129
The debate

122. Id. at 291.
123. Id.
124. See UMG Recordings, Inc., v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(citing Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145–46 (2d Cir. 1998);
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[A] copyrighterholder’s [sic]
‘exclusive’ rights, derived from the Constitution and the Copyright Act, include the right, within broad
limits, to curb the development of such a derivative market by refusing to license a copyrighted work or
by doing so only on terms the copyright owner finds acceptable”).
125. Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., ¶ 49 (July 3, 2012), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/.
126. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health
Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000)). While the definition may differ slightly from state
to state, this is a generally accepted definition for an adhesion contract.
127. Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass’n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 947 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Keenan, 216 Cal. Rptr. 318, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
128. Id. at 947–48 (citing Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172 (Cal. 1990).
129. SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1085 n.12 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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surrounding the enforceability of licenses began with the use of these
licenses by software companies.130 A number of courts found shrinkwrap
licenses invalid, “characterizing them as contracts of adhesion,
unconscionable, and/or unacceptable pursuant to the Uniform Commercial
Code.”131 These decisions, however, rested on the fact that the user had not
had the opportunity to assent;132 licensees of digital goods assent to a
license agreement before they are able to download the item.
The licensing agreements to which users are subjected prior to
obtaining digital goods are fairly obviously adhesion contracts: they are
imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, and the
user only has the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.133 It
seems unreasonable, however, that a corporation would separately
negotiate every single license with potential licensees. Therefore, it seems
unlikely that a court would find that the licensing schemes used in digital
goods are unenforceable adhesion contracts.
The Supreme Court could also choose to opine on this issue. It would
need to hold that the copyright owner’s reproduction right was not violated
and invalidate any licensing agreement attached to the purchase of the
good. The Court could easily hold that the reproduction right was not
violated through the reasoning in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.134 There, Sony had developed the Betamax videotape
recording device, which allowed consumers to make copies of television
shows for the purpose of “time shifting.”135 Universal City Studios argued
that the technology violated their exclusive rights granted in the Copyright
Act.136 The Court held that Sony was not liable and thus reaffirmed its
position that where “technological change has rendered its literal terms
ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of [its] basic
purpose”:137 to incentivize creative works for the “ultimate[] . . . cause of
130. See SoftMan Products Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d; see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
131. SoftMan Products Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1088 (citing Step–Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse
Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988)).
132. Id.
133. See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) (“In finding the CSA [agreement]
procedurally unconscionable, the district court emphasized that, after drafting the agreement, AT&T
imposed the CSA on its customers without opportunity for negotiation, modification, or waiver. We
agree. AT&T mailed the CSA in an envelope that few customers realized contained a contract, and
offered its terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.”).
134. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
135. Id. at 443 (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 468
(C.D. Cal. 1979), rev’d 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
136. Id. at 420.
137. Id. at 432 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
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promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other
Since digital technology has “rendered its literal terms
arts.”138
ambiguous,” the Court could find that ReDigi’s technology serves the
Copyright Act’s basic purpose by making “used” digital music available to
consumers more cheaply than “new” music from iTunes or Amazon, for
example.
The Court would then need to determine the effect of licensing
agreements on the first sale doctrine. The Court should take a functional
rather than a textual approach in construing the limits of a license. Before
the dawn of the digital age, some courts noted that the first sale doctrine
applied when the copyright proprietor was fairly compensated and had thus
“received his reward” for the use of the copyrighted material.139
Additionally, in Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that “courts should inquire into
whether the party exercises sufficient incidents of ownership over a copy of
the program to be sensibly considered the owner of the copy.”140 The
Court may also look to the international community’s response to the
application of exhaustion to digital goods: most notably, the UsedSoft
decision.141
While there are many policy justifications for permitting licensing
schemes, such as enabling price discrimination and decreasing piracy,
copyright owners are not granted a right to make their goods available
through tiered pricing models in the Copyright Act. In applying a
functional approach, the Court might determine that the licensing
agreements used by the music and electronic book industry are actually
“sales” for the purpose of the first sale doctrine. Specifically, it might grant
users the right to use the music or electronic book however they please, as
they have paid a fee that fairly remunerates the copyright owner. By
labeling the purchase of a digital good pursuant to a license a “sale,” the
Court would make secondary markets available for digital goods.
B. Judicial Response in the European Union
The ECJ has addressed the validity of exhaustion as applied to
software, but it is unclear whether exhaustion applies to all digital goods.
The UsedSoft decision relied on language in the Computer Programs

138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 431–32 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
402 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005).
See supra notes 96–108 and accompanying text.
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Directive to determine that exhaustion applies to software.142 The
Information Society Directive provides for the exhaustion of all other
copyrighted works.143 Given the recent German decision,144 the ECJ may
have the opportunity to clarify the application of the doctrine to all digital
goods.
The Information Society Directive was enacted by the European
Parliament and the Council of the European Union to harmonize the
copyright laws of the Member States, which would provide “increased
legal certainty . . . [and] a high level of protection of intellectual
property . . . [and] foster substantial investment in creativity and
innovation.”145 The Directive states that an act of communication does not
give rise to exhaustion; “first sale or other transfer of ownership” does,
however.146 The ECJ mentioned the Information Society Directive in
UsedSoft, stating:
[T]he existence of a transfer of ownership changes an ‘act of
communication to the public’ provided for in Article 3 of [the
Information Society Directive] into an act of distribution referred to in
Article 4 of the [Information Society Directive] which, if the conditions
in Article 4(2) of the [Information Society Directive] are satisfied, can,
like a ‘first sale . . . of a copy of a program’ referred to in Article 4(2) of
[the Computer Programs] Directive . . . , give rise to exhaustion of the
distribution right.147

Since the ECJ determined that a consumer downloading a product
from the Internet, paying the corresponding fee, and acquiring the right to
use it for an unlimited period is an “act of distribution,” giving rise to
exhaustion, it might also determine that downloading digital music and
electronic books is an act of distribution, which would give rise to
exhaustion under the Information Society Directive.
The ECJ does face obstacles to finding that exhaustion applies to all
digital goods, however. First, the Information Society Directive states that
“[t]he question of exhaustion does not arise in the case of services and online services in particular.”148 Additionally, unlike physical CD-ROMs or

142. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
143. Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 2, arts. 10, 12.
144. See supra notes 109–13 and accompanying text.
145. Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 2, recital 4.
146. Id. art. 4, ¶ 2.
147. Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., ¶ 52 (July 3, 2012), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/.
148. Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 2, recital 29.
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CD-Is, which are tangible media on which intellectual property is located,
“every on-line service is in fact an act which should be subject to
authorisation where the copyright or related right so provides.”149 As
technology advanced, the EU distinguished intangible items such as
downloaded digital goods from tangible items such as CD-ROMs, and it
appears that the EU, similar to the United States, is having difficulty
applying the rule of exhaustion to intangible items. Given the ECJ’s
concerns about the abuse of licenses to circumvent exhaustion,150 the court
may be open to an argument that downloading digital goods, as opposed to
streaming digital music, is not an “on-line service” and that therefore
exhaustion can arise.
Finally, the ECJ will have to determine whether the temporary
reproduction of a digital file that is currently necessary to make the file
available for resale is a lawful use. Article 2 of the Information Society
Directive “prohibit[s] direct or indirect, temporary or permanent
reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part.”151 Article
5(1) does allow for temporary reproductions “which are transient or
incidental [and] an integral and essential part of a technological process and
whose sole purpose is to enable: (a) a transmission in a network between
third parties by an intermediary, or (b) a lawful use.”152 As noted above,
the United States has determined that temporary reproductions are not
lawful.153 Given the ECJ’s broad interpretation of the rule of exhaustion
based on policy concerns about the ability of suppliers to abuse licenses to
circumvent the rule,154 it may be amenable to expanding the scope of
exhaustion to include all digital goods.
C. Legislative Response in the United States
Perhaps the most realistic opportunity for the creation and viability of
secondary markets for digital goods is through new legislation. In 2013,

149. Id.
150. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
151. Id. art. 2.
152. Id. art. 5, ¶ 1.
153. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107, 1109 (9th Cir 2010) (quoting 17 U.S.C. §
117(a)(1) (2012)) (“The exclusive distribution right is limited by the first sale doctrine, an affirmative
defense to copyright infringement that allows owners of copies of copyrighted works to resell those
copies. The exclusive reproduction right is limited within the software context by the essential step
defense, another affirmative defense to copyright infringement . . . . [whereby] a software user who is
the ‘owner of a copy’ of a copyrighted software program does not infringe by making a copy of the
computer program, if the new copy is ‘created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer
program in conjunction with a machine and . . . is used in no other manner.’”).
154. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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realizing the need to update the 1976 Copyright Act, Maria Pallante, the
current Registrar of the United States Copyright Office, called for Congress
to change the copyright statute, given “the age of the Internet, where
technology can so quickly affect the creation and communication of
creative materials.”155 Pallante reiterated that although the underlying
policy for the first sale doctrine is “rooted in the common law rule against
restraints on the alienation of tangible property,” Congress could choose to
review the rule’s application to digital goods.156 According to Pallante,
Congress has two choices in such a review:
On the one hand, Congress may believe that in a digital marketplace, the
copyright owner should control all copies of his work, particularly
because digital copies are perfect copies (not dog-eared copies of lesser
value) or because in online commerce the migration from the sale of
copies to the proffering of licenses has negated the issue. On the other
hand, Congress may find that the general principle of first sale has
ongoing merit in the digital age and can be adequately policed through
technology—for example, through measures that would prevent or
destroy duplicative copies. Or, more simply, Congress may not want a
copyright law where everything is licensed and nothing is owned.157

Additionally, the United States Patent and Trademark Office, in
collaboration with the Copyright Office, is attempting to find “a way to
preserve the [first sale] doctrine’s benefits, allowing the equivalent of
sharing favorite books with friends, or enabling the availability of lessthan-full-price versions to impecunious students” in the digital era, through
possible amendments to the Copyright Act.158 It acknowledged that
licensing is quickly becoming the common means of distribution for music
and electronic books, which will “render the first sale doctrine
meaningless” as applied to digital goods.159 In recognizing the implications
of licensing on secondary markets, the Patent & Trademark Office stated
that “courts or policy makers [may want] to reinterpret what constitutes a
‘license’ or to expand the scope of the first sale doctrine.”160
The United States Congress has unsuccessfully attempted to pass

155.
156.
157.
158.

Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 320 (2013).
Id. at 331.
Id. at 332.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND
INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 37 (2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/
publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf.
159. Id. at 36.
160. Id.
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legislation establishing a digital first sale doctrine. The Benefit Authors
Without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations
(BALANCE) Act of 2003 sought to amend section 109 of the Copyright
Act by allowing first sale to apply “if the owner does not retain the copy or
phonorecord in a retrievable form and the work is so sold or otherwise
disposed of in its original format.”161 Additionally, if digital works were
obtained subject to nonnegotiable license terms, the terms of such license
would be unenforceable.162 This legislation failed to become law due to the
loopholes that it left open regarding the reproduction right, its failure to
specify how the digital good would be deleted from the original owner’s
devices, and the severe limitations that it placed on the use of restrictive
licensing agreements.163
Given that “used” digital goods are indistinguishable from “new”
digital goods, Congress may have to alter the traditional first sale doctrine
to protect the original market for these goods. One suggestion has been to
institute a resale royalty scheme.164 By allowing copyright holders to
collect resale royalties for their digital goods sold in the secondary markets,
Congress would protect them from “the unique risks that nondegrading
digital formats, connected to a vast and limitless distribution system, pose
for copyright owners.”165
D. Legislative Response in the European Union
The legislative response in the European Union has similarly failed to
sufficiently address the growing inadequacies of current copyright law in
the digital era. In December of 2012, in response to the Hargreaves
Review of Intellectual Property and Growth, the United Kingdom’s
Intellectual Property Office released a report that set out a number of
recommendations for the UK to “adapt its strong but rigid framework for
copyright into one that is modern, robust and flexible.”166 The Office
recognized that “[t]he digital era and digital technologies provide new
opportunities across the creative sectors and beyond, but pose new
161. H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003).
162. Id. § 123(b).
163. Bill Summary & Status, 108th Congress (2003 - 2004), H.R. 1066, LIBR. CONGRESS:
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:H.R.1066: (last visited Mar. 26, 2014); Grant
Gross, Bill Would ‘Protect’ Consumers from DMCA: Effort Seen as Uphill Fight in Congress,
INFOWORLD (Mar. 5, 2003), http://www.infoworld.com/t/applications/bill-would-protect-consumersdmca-950?page=0,0.
164. See Serra, supra note 18, at 1798.
165. Id. at 1799.
166. HM GOVERNMENT, MODERNISING COPYRIGHT: A MODERN, ROBUST AND FLEXIBLE
FRAMEWORK 2 (2012), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/response-2011-copyright-final.pdf.
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questions of a copyright regime that is based on an analogue world.”167
Unfortunately, the proposed amendments do not squarely address digital
exhaustion. Specifically, the Office has proposed a private copying
exception, which would allow an individual to make a copy of a
copyrighted work and to permanently transfer that copy to another person
so long as the original copy is destroyed.168 Additionally, if any term of a
contract were to restrict or prevent an individual from copying or
transferring the copy to another person, that term would be deemed
unenforceable.169
Although this amendment is not explicitly limited to transfers of
physical copies, it would be difficult to argue that it sanctions the copying
of digital goods, as it fails to address the reproduction right that is currently
implicated in a digital transfer. Additionally, this proposal does not address
forward-and-delete technology, essentially leaving to the user the
responsibility of deleting the original file after it has been copied and
transferred to another user. Lastly, the private copying that is sanctioned
by the proposed amendment only applies to copies made for the
individual’s private use, not to copies made for commercial purposes (i.e.,
sales).170 On the bright side, the language of the amendment does limit the
use of restrictive licenses, which is necessary for the existence of digital
secondary markets.
*
*
*
While the recognition of a digital first sale doctrine in both the United
States and the European Union would make secondary digital markets
available, if secondary markets are to become a reality, any legislation will
ultimately have to address licensing schemes, the reproduction right, and
forward-and-delete technology. Specifically, legislation will need to place
limits on the acceptable terms of licensing agreements: that they cannot
prohibit the transfer or resale of digital goods. Legislation must also
address the reproduction right that is implicated during the transfer from
one user to another—perhaps by creating an exception to the reproduction
right when a digital file is copied for the sole purpose of completing a sale
or purchase in the secondary market. Lastly, legislation must address the
mechanisms for ensuring that the seller does not retain a copy of the digital
good after it is transferred to the buyer. The private sector may create
technology that circumvents the reproduction right when selling used
167. Id.
168. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, PRIVATE COPYING annex a, available at http://www.ipo.gov.
uk/types/hargreaves/hargreaves-copyright/hargreaves-copyright-techreview.htm.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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digital goods and sufficient forward-and-delete technology. Legislation
would still be required, however, to limit the use of restrictive licensing
schemes in connection with obtaining digital goods. Ultimately, legislators
must accept the fact that the current copyright regimes do not sufficiently
protect consumers in the digital era.
CONCLUSION
To “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”171 in the United
States and to “ensur[e] the maintenance and development of creativity in
the interests of authors, performers, producers, consumers, culture, industry
and the public at large”172 in the European Union, consumers should be
able to purchase and sell digital goods in the secondary market. While
consumers in the United States do not have access to any secondary
markets for digital goods, the European Union has recognized the valuable
space that secondary markets occupy in today’s digital age, at least with
regards to software, but have not yet applied the rule of exhaustion to all
digital goods.173
In the United States, the Southern District of New York is the most
recent court to foreclose secondary markets with its ruling in ReDigi.174
Although the ECJ determined that exhaustion applied to software in
UsedSoft, the recent decision by the German Regional Court stated that the
reasoning in UsedSoft does not apply to other digital goods and therefore
held that exhaustion does not apply to electronic books.175 Despite this
decision, ReDigi is now preparing to launch in Europe, likely due to the
application of exhaustion to software and perhaps to their optimistic
outlook on the European Union applying exhaustion to all digital goods.176
This paper’s suggested changes can be made through either the
judicial or legislative systems. Although the courts in both the United
States and the European Union have been averse to applying the first sale
doctrine and exhaustion to digital goods, the ECJ has recognized the danger
of allowing restrictive licensing agreements in connection with obtaining
software: by attaching a license to a transaction, the first sale doctrine and
the exhaustion doctrine are completely circumvented, giving manufacturers
and distributors the power to control all downstream sales. This reasoning
171. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
172. Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 2.
173. See supra Part V.
174. See supra Part I.
175. See supra Part V.
176. ReDigi is Crossing the Pond! Sign up to Stay in the Loop!, REDIGI, http://newsroom.redigi.
com/europe/ (last visited May 4, 2014) (“ReDigi is preparing to open its doors in Europe.”).
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should be expanded to apply to all digital goods, both in the European
Union and the United States, which in turn would limit the enforceability of
restrictive licensing agreements and allow digital goods to be sold and
purchased in secondary markets.
While the judicial systems in the United States and the European
Union have the ability to transform copyright law, the most efficient way to
make the necessary changes would be through new copyright legislation.
Unfortunately, legislators in both the United States and the European Union
have failed to adequately address the barriers that currently prevent the
availability of secondary markets for digital goods. If secondary markets
are going to be a viable marketplace for consumers to purchase and sell
used digital goods, it is imperative that the United States and the European
Union make changes to their arcane copyright laws. Simply creating a
digital first sale doctrine, however, does not entirely solve the problem;
they must allow for intermediate copying so that the actual purchase or sale
of digital goods does not infringe a copyright owner’s reproduction right.
Additionally, limits must be placed on the acceptable terms of restrictive
licensing agreements in connection with digital goods. These changes
would not only modernize the current copyright regimes but also recognize
the important role that consumers play in the dissemination and promotion
of the arts and sciences in the digital era.

